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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent instability in the Middle East and its effect on both
the domestic and world economies illustrates the importance of long-
term contracts.' Long-term contracts can allow parties to avoid sudden
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1. Oil, a strategic commodity for almost all of the world's economies, jumped in
price from just over $15 a barrel prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to over $40 by Octo-
ber 15, 1990 (Brent North Sea Crude). Crude Oil Falls Below $30 as Sentiment Shifts
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and temporary increases in prices caused by shocks to the economy.2
This instability has emphasized the importance of contract law and the
doctrines of commercial impracticability, frustration of purpose, and
mistake. Earlier oil crises demonstrated the importance and relevance
of these doctrines.3 A commercial entity can attempt to limit the long-
term negative effects of such shocks to the economy through the use of
strategic planning and long-term contracts.
A. Strategic Planning for Businesses
Strategic planning is an important aspect of any successful busi-
ness. A business must carefully manage its growth. For example, a
manufacturing concern must forecast its potential sales growth so that
management can determine production requirements. A forecast also
provides a realistic outlook for the company's shareholders and lend-
ers. Based on this forecast, management may hire more employees,
seek more or less manufacturing space, obtain a steady source of raw
materials, or seek additional sources of capital.
The strategic planning process for a manufacturer usually starts
with the sales department forecasting sales volume and timing for the
period in question. Once management is comfortable with this number,
which is essentially a good faith estimate, the forecast is sent to the
purchasing department. The purchasing department then estimates
the raw materials needed to meet the sales forecast. Next, it locates
sources for the needed raw materials and seeks commitments from its
suppliers to provide the raw materials. The company probably will
contact several suppliers to obtain the best price and an assurance that
the supplier can provide the materials on time. Often the needed
materials come from overseas and are seasonal in nature, or they are in
After Statements in Middle East, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1990, at A3, col. 2 (see the accom-
panying graph in the newspaper article, which shows July-October rise in prices).
2. Many shocks to the economy, such as recent increases in oil prices, are only of
brief duration. If the term of a contract is several years, the buyer and seller in a fixed-
price contract would be able to avoid the effects of any short-term price fluctuation. A
long.term contract provides an element of stability during which the contract price will
not be subject to change. Any risk of a short-term price fluctuation is thus tempered by
the long-term commitment to price. If the contract term is long enough, the price of the
particular commodity may rise or fall and return to its original price during the contract
term. Thus, many purchasers of oil products avoided price increases during the recent
Middle East War through their long-term contracts. The risk exists, however, that any
change in a commodity's price will be a long-term change. If the change extended beyond
the contract's term, it would potentially limit the benefit from a long-term contract.
3. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text; Gulf Oil Corp v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); Day v Tenneco,
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
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short supply and cannot be guaranteed.
Of the many variables, the most important to management is to
obtain reliable sources for raw materials at a reasonable 'price. In the
United States, corporate management views labor as a variable cost,
one that can be increased or decreased as demand dictates. Employers
are usually able to hire on short notice all but the most skilled
employees.
A manufacturer must obtain reliable sources for its raw materials
to efficiently meet customer demand. Unless a manufacturer has a
unique or very high-quality product, most customers will not accept a
long delay in delivery. Customers also want a stable price so that they
can incorporate the manufacturer's prices into the cost of their own
finished products.
In order to achieve price stability and assured sources of raw
materials, a company will attempt to enter into long-term, fixed-price
contracts with its suppliers. Such contracts significantly reduce the ele-
ment of risk for the buyer because the buyer is contractually guaran-
teed a supply of goods at a set price for a set number of years.4
Although the strategic planning process is generally the same
throughout the business world, different industries address the need to
obtain a steady source of raw materials in different ways. Sellers gener-
ally seek to enter into volume purchase or minimum purchase agree-
ments. Purchasers prefer contracts that do not bind them to minimum
purchase quantities.
In the oil and gas industry, energy suppliers often enter "take or
pay" contracts that bind a purchaser to take the gas it contracted for
or pay for it even if not used." These contracts seem to be unique to
the energy industry. The energy industry, along with the agricultural
industry, often enters into "commitment contracts" in which the pur-
chaser agrees to purchase the entire output of an oil well or the entire
crop prior to the planting season. The price agreed upon represents an
allocation of risk between the parties.'
Given the size of some companies, the risk and the accompanying
dollar value involved may be quite large. For this reason, many compa-
nies protect themselves from risk by purchasing futures. This is espe-
cially true in the food industry and in those industries that utilize pre-
4. These contracts are known as volume purchase agreements. They provide for
discounts commensurate with a certain level of purchases. These contracts may or may
not have a minimum purchase amount or "billbacks" if the purchaser fails to buy a
minimum dollar amount. In either case, the price is usually the variable element in the
contract. The more definite the purchase requirement by the buyer, the lower the price.
5. See generally A New Opportunity for Lawyers, FORBES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 152.
6. See, e.g., Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 108 Idaho 892, 702 P.2d
930 (Ct. App. 1985).
1991]
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cious metals such as gold, silver, copper, and platinum. By using puts
or calls, an entity can limit its exposure on the price of a particular
commodity at a predetermined time in the future. In this manner, an
entity can also protect itself from significant price swings in a commod-
ity on which its business depends.
Companies that buy and sell commodities internationally also seek
to limit their liability from currency fluctuations. They will purchase
currency futures in the particular currency in which products are pur-
chased or sold. The cost of these options is incorporated into the price
of each product or profit margin. By providing for both an increase in
raw material cost and a decrease in currency value, an entity's risk is
minimized considerably.
B. Impact of Economic Fluctuation on Business Planning
The recent fluctuations in the United States economy have em-
phasized the importance of long-term strategic planning and long-term
contracts. The immediate and sharp increase in energy prices has af-
fected almost every industry. For some, the impact is immediate.
Long-term contracts will not eliminate the problems associated with an
increase in energy prices, but will reduce the number and magnitude of
these problems.
Sharp price swings in raw materials force companies to stress long-
term planning. Necessity will dictate that companies place greater reli-
ance on contracts and planning to ensure a reasonable supply of raw
materials at a reasonable price. This is very important because the
company itself might have executed a supply contract with a third
party to supply the third party with goods at a set price.
If a manufacturer could not rely on its contractually mandated
commitments, it might be paralyzed. If the supplier of the manufac-
turer's raw materials failed to make delivery, the manufacturer would
still have to meet its commitment to the ultimate purchaser.
To compensate for such problems, a manufacturer might seek a
security deposit from the other contracting party to ensure that party's
compliance. Requiring companies to provide a security deposit, a letter
of credit, or a bond could cause severe financial hardship. Letters of
credit or bonds can be costly and a security deposit restricts much-
needed capital. Before requiring a purchaser to provide any of these,
the manufacturer first must determine whether these options, given
the nature of the industry, allow the manufacturer to compete. If the
manufacturer is the only manufacturer in its product market requiring
a security deposit, its vendors and customers probably will use other
7. See infra text accompanying notes 169-70.
[Vol. 42
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manufacturers. If a manufacturer must incorporate these costs, a form
of security will have to be built into the pricing structure, which raises
the ultimate cost of the goods to consumers.
If the sanctity of long-term contracts is disturbed, the accompany-
ing uncertainty could create instability in the economic markets. With-
out the stability provided by long-term contracts, the economy itself
might mirror any strong fluctuations in the costs of raw materials. As a
result, any sharp swing in the price of raw materials, such as energy
costs, could be much more pronounced than under the present system,
which creates even greater concern.
Because allocating risks through long-term contracts is essential to
accurate planning and, thus, to the viability of a business in a free
market economy, courts rarely excuse sophisticated commercial parties
from their contractual obligations. Therefore, contracting parties rely
on the judiciary's reluctance to intervene in commercial agreements. If
the courts adopted a more liberal policy toward judicial intervention in
contractual relations, the assumption that agreements will be enforced
would be at risk and the stability created by contractual relations
would be threatened. To protect the significant economic benefits cre-
ated by long-term contractual agreements, courts should continue to
limit intervention in contractual relations.
Part II of this Article reviews the traditional legal foundations for
judicial intervention in contractual agreements. It also discusses the re-
quirements for judicial intervention based on commercial impractica-
bility, frustration of purpose, mistake, and force majeure, as well as
the willingness of the judiciary to excuse performance based on these
theories. Part III examines the relationships between these doctrines,
and Part IV examines the potential impact on our economic system of
taking a more liberal approach toward judicial intervention. Finally,
this Article argues that little justification exists for expanding judicial
intervention in contractual agreements.
II. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
Several legal concepts allow judicial intervention in a contractual
relationship. In order of relative importance, they are: (1) commercial
impracticability, (2) frustration of purpose, (3) mistake, and (4) force
majeure.
A. Commercial Impracticability
The doctrine of commercial impracticability is incorporated into
1991]
5
Classen: Judicial Intervention in Contractual Relationships Under the Unif
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).8 Section 2-615 of the U.C.C.
provides:
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or part by a seller ... is
not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if a performance as
agreed has been made impractical by the occurrence of a contingency
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made ....
Thus, three elements are necessary to establish a commercial im-
practicability defense: (1) the seller must not have assumed the risk of
some unknown contingency; (2) the nonoccurrence of the contingency
must have been a basic assumption underlying the contract; and (3)
the occurrence of that contingency must have made performance com-
mercially impracticable.10 Courts rarely allow a party relief from its
contractual obligations, however, on the basis of commercial impracti-
cability.1 Thus, courts that construe section 2-615 carefully distinguish
8. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1988). The commercial impracticability doctrine arose from the
common-law doctrine of frustration or impossibility, which is most often illustrated by
the body of case law generated from the various closings of the Suez Canal. Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1325 (E.D. La.
1981) (citing Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966));
see also Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd, 315 F.2d 162
(2d Cir. 1963). See generally American Trading and Prod. Co. v. Shell Int'l Marine, 453
F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972) (doctrine of commercial impracticability did not apply to ship-
ment of goods from Texas to India, despite the closing of the Suez Canal, when the
contract did not specify a route and the Cape route was an acceptable alternative).
9. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1988) (emphasis added). Section 2-615 governs only the sale of
"goods," which has been broadly defined under the Code as: "all things (including spe-
cially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the con-
tract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities
(Article 8) and things in action." Id. § 2-105.
10. Friedco, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank, 529 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1981); Iowa Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp, 129, 134 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980). Traditionally,
the commercial impracticability doctrine has been applied to sellers. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1015 (1986); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517
F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. La. 1981). It has also been applied to purchasers in a few isolated
cases. See U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 9 (1988); Hancock Paper Co. v. Champion Int'l Corp.,
424 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1977); Nora Springs Coop.
Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1976). Cf. Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse,
Inc,, 108 Idaho 892, 702 P.2d 930 (Ct. App. 1985) (buyer is entitled to exemption if
statutory requirements are met); Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc. 122 Ill. App.
3d 940, 954, 461 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (1984) (citing comment 9, the court held § 2-615
applies to buyers that meet statutory requirements).
11. McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 775 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshburger J. concur-
ring); see also Jennie-O Foods v. United States, 580 F.2d 400, 409 (Ct. Cl. 1978) ("[Tjhis
Court has not applied [the doctrine of commercial impracticability] with frequency or
[Vol.,42
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between whether a contract is physically impossible or is instead com-
mercially impracticable to perform. 2
Defining commercial impracticability is difficult because the
U.C.C. does not define "basic assumption" and "impracticability." The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "impracticability" de-
notes a meaning between "impossibility" and "impracticality."' "3 How-
ever, the courts have not reached a consensus on a definition. Some
courts have stated that to show commercial impracticability, the party
seeking to excuse performance must demonstrate that "the cost of per-
formance has in fact become so excessive 'and unreasonable that the
failure to excuse performance would result in grave injustice."' 4
Under this standard, showing mere loss or unanticipated expense
is not sufficient. The loss or expense must be severe, extreme, exces-
sive, or unreasonable.'" An increase in the price of raw materials does
not amount to impracticability unless it is well beyond a normal price
increase because price changes can be addressed by fixed price con-
tracts. To excuse performance, therefore, the subsequent price increase
must be significant or unreasonable.
6
enthusiasm."); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 134 n.7
(1978) ("The doctrine of impracticability has been narrowly construed."). The Atlas
court stated further: "Although proponents of liberal interpretation point to Mineral
Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458, 460 (1916), for the proposition that
excessive and unreasonable cost can excuse performance, few courts have excused per-
formance on that theory alone." Atlas, 467 F. Supp at 134 n.7 (italics omitted).
12. E.g., International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 886
(10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175, 146 P.2d 883 (1944)); Freidco,
Ltd. v. Farmers Bank, 529 F. Supp. 822, 825 (D. Del. 1981) ("Although the standard of
impracticability is not impossibility, neither is it mere impracticality."); 18 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1978, at 886 (3d ed. 1978 & Supp. 1990) ("Phys-
ical impossibility is no longer required to show impracticability; performance can become
impracticable due to some unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss .... "). Al-
though § 2-613 allows relief only if performance is physically impossible, courts do not
construe § 2-615 as strictly.
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 comment d (1981).
14. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 599 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); Sabine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1176
(W.D. Okla. 1989) (the court explained that "[w]hether 'grave injustice' would result
from failure to excuse performance is merely an inquiry used to assess whether the cost
to the contracting party of performing the contract is so excessive and unreasonable as
to warrant the conclusion that performance has become impracticable.") (emphasis in
original); Freidco, 529 F. Supp. at 825 (quoting Gulf Oil, 563 F.2d at 599).
15. The International Minerals court required "extreme or unreasonable difficulty,
expense, injury or loss." 770 F.2d at 886 (quoting Wood v. Bartolino, 48 N.M. 175, 146
P.2d 883 (1944) and 6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1981 (1938)); see Gulf Oil, 563 F.2d at
600; Sabine, 725 F. Supp. at 1175; Freidco, 529 F. Supp. at 825; Northern Ill. Gas Co. v.
Energy Coop., Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 940, 461 N.E.2d 1049 (1984).
16. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
1991]
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A number of factors may influence a court to conclude that a
twenty percent price increase is not unreasonable in one case while a
twelve percent increase in another case may be unreasonable. One po-
tential factor is the importance of the particular good in the pur-
chaser's overall manufacturing process and the percentage of the
good's cost in relation to the cost of the final product.17 Price increases
must be viewed in light of the underlying contract, including the quan-
tity to be purchased and the length of the contract."8 Comparing the
cost of a good that was originally $100,000 and increases twenty per-
cent to $120,000, to the cost of a good that doubles in price from one
dollar to two dollars illustrates that the aggregate financial impact on a
purchaser would be much greater if it purchased a large quantity of
$100,000 items versus a small quantity of one dollar items. The greater
the aggregate dollar value, the greater the impact and, thus, the greater
the importance to the court, especially if meeting these contractual ob-
ligations threatened the business with bankruptcy. 19
Another factor a court may consider is the foreseeability of any
potential increase in price. The court in Maple Farms, Inc. v. City
School District20 stated that "where the circumstances reveal a willing-
ness on the part of the seller to accept abnormal rises in costs, the
question of impracticability of performance should be judged by
stricter terms than where the contingency is totally unforeseen.
21
Thus, in Maple the seller was not entitled to relief because he knew
that the price of milk had fluctuated significantly in the past and could
do so in the future.
A third factor is the ability of one party to mitigate its damages
and fulfill its contractual obligations. In Transatlantic Financing
("While it may be an overstatement to say that increased cost and difficulty of perform-
ance never constitute impracticability, to justify relief there must be more of a variation
between expected cost and the cost of performing by an available alternative than is
present in this case .... "); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp.
129 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (an increase in price of 50% to 58% did not justify relief); Ameri-
can Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine, Ltd., 343 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(less than 33% increase in cost of shipping material did not justify relief); Mineral Park
Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916) (over 1000% cost increase justified
relief); Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 108 Idaho 892, 702 P.2d 930 (Ct. App.
1985) (a 40% increase in price did not justify relief); Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School
District, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (a 23% cost increase did not
justify relief).
17. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 108 Idaho 892, 702 P.2d
930 (Ct. App. 1985).
18. See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Colo. 289, 159 P. 458 (1916).
19. See, e.g., id.; Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 108 Idaho at 892, 702 P.2d at 930.
20. 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
21. Id. at 1085, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
[Vol. 42
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Corp. v. United States22 the court held "there must be more of a varia-
tion between expected cost and the cost of performing by an available
alternative than is present in this case. '23 Thus, the court implies that
it will consider the alternative means available that would allow a
party to fulfill its contractual obligations and will also consider the ac-
companying cost.
Two decisions, both in the United States Court of Claims, have
also indicated judicial leniency in crop failure disputes. In Dillon v.
United States24 and Mitchell Canneries, Inc. v. United States25 the
court allowed the plaintiffs to recover for the excess costs incurred to
provide food to the army because of unforeseen circumstances. The va-
lidity and applicability of these cases to other areas is questionable,
however, because they are firmly rooted in the doctrine of strict
impossibility.2"
Finally, a particular court may be more sympathetic than another
depending on the nature of the case. An Oklahoma court may be much
more willing than a Florida court to rule in favor of energy producer
that has been hurt by a sudden fluctuation in energy prices on an im-
practicability claim. Consequently, different courts will interpret the
law differently, resulting in a degree of disparity.
The commercial impracticability doctrine is illustrated in Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.27 In that case Gulf agreed to supply all
of Eastern's reasonable demands for aviation fuel at several locations.
The contract contained a price index clause that allowed Gulf to pass
on to Eastern any increase in the price of crude oil. The price index
was tied to the cost of a widely traded grade of oil known as "West
Texas Sour."
28
Shortly after the execution of the contract, the United States gov-
ernment levied price controls on West Texas Sour and, consequently,
on the price of jet fuel under the contract. In 1973 the government
implemented a two-tiered price structure for domestically produced
oil.29 The amount of oil produced by each well in May 1972 was the
benchmark for these price controls. Oil produced by those new wells in
excess of the benchmark amount, and oil produced by new wells, was
22. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
23. Id. at 319.
24. 156 F. Supp. 719 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
25. 77 F. Supp. 498 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
26. Note, UCC § 2-615 Defining Impracticability Due to Increased Expense, 32 U.
FLA. L. REV. 516, 535 n.155 (1980).
27. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
28. Id. at 432-33.
29. Id. at 433.
1991]
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not restricted in price. 0
Prior to 1973 foreign oil was marginally less expensive than do-
mestic oil. When OPEC initiated its oil embargo in 1973, however, the
cost of foreign oil increased dramatically, causing the price of the do-
mestic oil that was not restricted in price to rise as well.31 Gulf sought
to terminate the contract on the basis of commercial impracticability.
Gulf argued that the contract was no longer profitable because of the
increased market price of foreign and certain domestic crude oil and,
thus, it should be excused from performance.
32
The Eastern court held Gulf was not entitled to relief under the
doctrine of commercial impracticability.33 The court recognized that
unprofitability alone will not render a contract commercially impracti-
cable." It cited comment 435 and comment 836 to section 2-615 of the
U.C.C. to justify its decision.37 The court discounted Gulf's two argu-
ments: that the price index did not work as originally intended, and
that oil prices had risen without any corresponding rise in the fuel
prices under the contract. The pricing index used in the contract was
based upon West Texas Sour for which the price was fixed. It did not
reflect the higher price of foreign oil which accounted for a significant
portion of Gulf's cost of raw materials in refining jet fuel." Finally, the
court emphasized that the oil crisis was reasonably foreseeable and
30. Id. at 433-34.
31. Id. at 434.
32. Id. at 440.
33. Id. at 441.
34. Id. at 438-39.
35. U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 4 (1988) provides:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due
to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the per-
formance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification,
for that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at
fixed prices are intended to cover. But a severe shortage of raw materials or of
supplies due to a contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unfore-
seen shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which either causes a
marked increase in cost or altogether prevents the seller from securing supplies
necessary to his performance, is within the contemplation of this section.
36. U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 8 (1988) provides:
The provisions of this section are made subject to assumption of greater liabil-
ity by agreement and such agreement is to be found not only in the expressed
terms of the contract but in the circumstances surrounding the contracting, in
trade usage and the like. Thus the exemptions of this section do not apply
when the contingency in question is sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of
contracting to be included among the business risks which are fairly to be re-
garded as part of the dickered terms, either consciously or as a matter of rea-
sonable, commercial interpretation from the circumstances.
37. Eastern, 415 F. Supp. at 438.
38. Id. at 439-40.
[Vol. 42
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that Gulf should have taken actions to protect itself.3 9
The Eastern court correctly applied existing contract law to the
factual situation. It recognized the importance of long-term contracts
for the smooth operation of the nation's economy. The facts of the case
revealed that both parties were pleased with the agreement when they
signed it. Gulf obtained a steady market for the fuel produced by its
new plant, and Eastern received immediate savings through reduced
base prices.40 Only when Gulf began to suffer a loss because of a
change in oil prices did it seek relief from the pricing mechanism es-
tablished in the contract.
4'
B. Frustration of Purpose
The legal theory of "frustration of purpose" or "discharge by su-
pervening frustration" is defined by section 265 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts:
42
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is sub-
stantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made, his remaining duties to render performance are
discharged, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the
contrary.'
Under the Restatement, to successfully bring an action to rescind
a contract for frustration of purpose, a party must prove that the prin-
cipal purpose of the contract is frustrated, that the frustration is sub-
stantial, and that the nonoccurrence of the frustrating event is a signif-
icant assumption underlying the agreement.""
The requirements for proving frustration of purpose are substan-
tially similar to those for proving commercial impracticability. 5 In the
case of a price change the party seeking rescission must demonstrate
disparity in the existing market price and the contract price, and that
the nonoccurrence of such a price change was a basic assumption un-
derlying the agreement. 46 Discharge of a party's obligations under this
doctrine, however, has been limited to situations in which a "virtually
cataclysmic, wholly unforeseeable event renders the contract valueless
39. Id. at 441-42.
40. Id. at 432.
41. Id. at 439-41.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1981).
43. Id.
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to one party.147
The clear intent when parties enter into a long-term, fixed-price
contract is to ensure supply and a market for the underlying commod-
ity at a defined price with the goal to make a profit.48 In reaching such
an agreement, the parties agree upon a price that fairly and adequately
compensates them for the risk each bears. To correctly determine
whether substantial frustration exists, a court must look to the parties'
objective intent when they executed the agreement.
4
1
It is extremely difficult to demonstrate that the purpose of the
contract has been frustrated because it is difficult to determine the in-
tent of the parties when they entered into the agreement. The parties
most likely entered into a long-term, fixed-price contract to limit the
effect of any unforeseen price changesY' The Restatement requires
that the object of the contract must so permeate the basis for the con-
tract's existence that, as both parties understand, without it the con-
tract makes little sense.51 The intent of one party to receive or to pay a
competitive market price for the commodity for the term of the agree-
ment is not enough to justify rescinding the contract.52
A court must interpret a contract by its plain meaning.5 3 It should
not attempt to determine the subjective intent of the parties because
their subjective intent is irrelevant.5 4 The parties are bound by their
objective intent as manifested in their contract.5 5 Otherwise the under-
lying principles of contract law would collapse.
In Hotchkiss v. National City Bank5 6 Judge Learned Hand articu-
47. United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 508 F.2d 377,
381 (2d Cir. 1974). Contra RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 comment a
(1981) ("foreseeability of the event is here, as it is [with impracticability], a factor in
that determination, but the mere fact that the event was foreseeable does not compel the
conclusion that its non-occurrence was not such a basic assumption.").
48. See Lawrence v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 108 Idaho 892, 895, 702 P.2d
930, 932 (Ct. App. 1985) (The reason the defendant contracted to grow pinto beans was
because "there was a chance to make a profit . . ").
49. Id.; Hancock Paper Co. v. Champion Int'l Corp., 424 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa.
1976), afJ'd, 565 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1977).
50. See, e.g., Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. v. Carbon County Coal, 799 F.2d 265, 278
(7th Cir. 1986).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 comment a (1981); see MacArthur
Senior Village, 508 F.2d at 381.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 comment a (1981).
53. See Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 824 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1987); Hancock Paper Co.,
424 F. Supp. at 289.
54. Hancock Paper Co., 424 F. Supp. at 289.
55. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 comment b (1981)
(the language of the contract controls the application of the rule).
56. 200 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), af['d sub nom. Ernst v. Mechanics' & Metals Nat'l
Bank, 201 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), afl'd, 231 U.S. 60 (1913).
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lated the reason for accepting the objective intent of the parties to
bind them to the pricing provisions of the contract. Judge Hand wrote:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached
by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words,
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, how-
ever, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he
used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning
which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there
were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.
57
The Restatement clearly provides that failure of the transaction to
become profitable for a party will not frustrate the purpose of a con-
tract.58 For the party seeking rescission, this statement goes to the core
of its argument. Because the contract is no longer profitable due to
changes in market pricing, the disadvantaged party believes it should
no longer be bound by the contract. Under such reasoning, the sole
"purpose" of the contract would be to make a profit and if the party
can no longer do so, its purpose has been frustrated. If this reasoning is
accepted, every contract could be terminated under its force majeure
clause. The correct interpretation requires the court to recognize that
the initial reason the party entered into the contract was to buy or sell
the underlying commodity. The court should ignore the motivation of
each party to make a financial profit.
The comments to the Restatement indicate that in certain limited
situations the frustration could be so severe that the frustrating event
cannot be fairly regarded as within the risks assumed by the parties to
the contract. 9 By agreeing to a fixed price, both parties agree to bear
the risk of any decrease or increase in the market price."
C. Mistake
In an effort to avoid severe economic injury for strong swings in
the market price of a commodity, many parties attempt to reform or
rescind the agreement on the basis of a mutual mistake.6 1 One justifi-
cation for such a claim is that in reaching the agreement, they never
realized that the price of the underlying commodity could change so
57. Id. at 293.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 comment a (1981).
59. Id.
60. Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line, Co., 813 F.2d 77, 80 (5th
Cir. 1987).
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drastically.6 2 Thus, no meeting of the minds or requisite intent to form
a contract existed. The doctrine of "mutual mistake" provides:
[w]here a mistake of both parties at the time a contract was made as
to a basic assumption on which the contract was made has a material
effect on the agreed exchange of performances, the contract is voida-
ble by the adversely affected party unless he bears the risk of the mis-
take .... 13
"Mistake" is defined as "a belief that is not in accord with the facts. '64
If the mistake is unilateral, however, relief will not be granted.6 5
1. Reformation
Reformation is an equitable remedy that may be imposed in the
presence of a mutual mistake.6 6 It requires clear and convincing evi-
dence of an antecedent agreement in which the terms of a writing
should be reformed and a mutual mistake that resulted in a writing
which does not reflect either party's intention. Additionally, the party
seeking reformation must be free of neglect. Parole evidence may be
used to prove that the parties' actual intent is not reflected in the writ-
ten agreement.6 8
A party seeking reformation must prove that the assumptions un-
derlying its decision to enter into the agreement were mistaken.6 9 Dem-
onstrating that a mistake was mutual is difficult because the com-
plaining party must show evidence of the other party's beliefs,
understanding, or assumptions when the parties entered into the
agreement, to prove the mistake was mutual. Thus, the complaining
party has the difficult task of proving that the agreement was condi-
tioned on the unusual assumption that the price of the underlying
62. See Resources Inv. Corp. v. Enron Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (D. Colo.
1987); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 60-67 (W.D. Pa.
1980).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (1981).
64. Id. § 151.
65. See, e.g., Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1972).
66. McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 769 (W.Va. 1984); see also Bond v. Chal-
fant, 201 Okla. 600, 603, 208 P.2d 535, 537 (1949) (allowing rescission of a deed); Lovell
v. City of Altus, 118 Okla. 106, 109, 246 P. 468, 470 (1925) (allowing rescission of contrac-
tor's bid).
67. Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison, 621 P.2d 528, 533 (Okla. 1980); Boettler v.
Rothmire, 442 P.2d 511, 514-15 (Okla. 1968); Dennis v. American-First Title & Trust
Co., 405 P.2d 993, 997-98 (Okla. 1965).
68. Nelson v. Daugherty, 357 P.2d 425, 432 (Okla. 1960); Webster v. Woods, 586
P.2d 337, 338 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
69. Nelson, 357 P.2d at 425; Webster, 586 P.2d at 337.
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commodity would remain near the contract price.
2. Rescission
Rescission of a contract because of mutual mistake is an appropri-
ate remedy when there has been no "meeting of the minds" between
the contracting parties regarding a fact that goes to the essence of the
agreement.7 0 The contract is unenforceable because the parties did not
truly agree. 71 The complaining party must demonstrate that the mu-
tual mistake concerns a past or present fact material to the agreement
and not a mistake of prophecy or opinion relative to an uncertain
event.72 A contracting party is not entitled to rescission merely because
of subsequent developments turn a contractual provision to his disad-
vantage.7 3 Thus, mistaken predictions regarding future economic con-
ditions do not justify relief from a contract.
7 4
Alternatively, a party must show that the mistake concerned a ma-
terial portion of the agreement and, therefore, prevented a meeting of
the minds.7 5 As when seeking reformation, the complaining party must
demonstrate that it was not negligent when it entered into the agree-
ment s.7 The moving party is faced with the difficult task of proving
that any mistake was mutual.77 It is difficult to show the other party's
motives or beliefs when entering into an agreement. Furthermore, the
complaining party can expect strong opposition to its motion because
the other party typically stands to benefit significantly.
70. See supra note 69.
71. Madill Bank & Trust Co. v. Herrman, 738 P.2d 567, 572 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987)
(citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 15 §§ 62-64 and Watkins v. Grady County Soil and Water Conser-
vation Dist., 438 P.2d 491 (Okla. 1968)).
72. See Holmes v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 574 P.2d 297, 298-99 (Okla. 1978)
(quoting Davis v. Higgins, 95 Okla. 32, 217 P. 193, 195 (1923) and Birch v. Kee, 449 P.2d
700, 702 (Okla. 1969)).
73. Id.
74. Resources Inv. Corp. v. Enron Corp., 669 F. Supp. 1038, 1042-43 (D. Colo.
1987).
75. Watkins v. Grady County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 438 P.2d 491, 494
(Okla. 1968); Madill Bank & Trust Co. v. Herrmann, 738 P.2d 567, 572 (Okla. Ct. App.
1987).
76. Ware v. City of Tulsa, 312 P.2d 946, 950 (Okla. 1957) (citing Eason Oil Co. v.
Whiteside, 175 Okla. 254, 256, 52 P.2d 35, 37 (1935)).
77. The moving party may introduce parole evidence, however, to show that the
contract does not reflect the intent of the parties. Nelson v. Daugherty, 357 P.2d 425, 432
(Okla. 1960). The parole evidence rule does not apply because the evidence being intro-
duced is not being used to contradict or vary the contract. Webster v. Woods, 586 P.2d
337, 338 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978).
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D. Force Majeure
The term force majeure is derived from the french language and is
translated as a superior or irresistible force.78 In everyday usage it has
come to be equated with "an act of God." 7 Although the concept of
force majeure is easily understood, it is very difficult to identify a pre-
cise legal definition. A force majeure clause "protect[s] the parties in
the event that a part of the contract cannot be performed due to
causes which are outside the control of the parties and could not be
avoided by exercise of due care." 80 Courts have defined force majeure
as an unforeseen event that may excuse nonperformance within the
contract period,8' or an event beyond a party's control and occurring
without its fault or negligence.
8 2
Because force majeure clauses by their nature are designed to pro-
tect against an unanticipated contingency, they cannot be limited to a
precise definition or a finite list of examples. Consequently, most
agreements that contain a list of examples are careful to provide that
the force majeure clause includes, but is not limited to, the events con-
tained in the list.
8 3
78. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 645 (6th ed. 1990). Force majeure is synonymous with
the latin expression vis major. See Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d
228, 238, 174 P.2d 441, 447 (1946). It has also been referred to as force majesture. See
Fogg v. Van Saun Coal Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 680, 681, 174 A. 419, 420 (1934).
79. See, e.g., General Index A-F, "Force Majeure," AM. JUR. 2D 795 (1988).
80. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 645 (6th ed. 1990).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120, 122-24 (1943)
(referring to a nonwarranty contract); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 706 F.2d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
Most contractual agreements provide a laundry list of excusable events instead of
attempting to articulate a definition of force majeure. The most prevalent events set
forth in such agreements include: acts of God, fire, flood, acts of civil disobedience, war,
riot, nuclear disaster, labor disputes, acts of governments, unusual climatic conditions,
acts of a public enemy, explosion, or power failure. See, e.g., Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occiden-
tal Crude Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 1530, 1539 (5th Cir. 1984); Eastern Air Lines, Inc., v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 998 (5th Cir. 1976).
The test of whether an event of force majeure exists is whether "under the particu-
lar circumstances there was such an insuperable interference occurring without the
party's intervention as could not have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, dili-
gence, and care." Pacific Vegetable, 29 Cal. 2d at 238, 174 P.2d at 447. See also National
Carbon Co. v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., 77 F.2d 614, 617 (10th Cir. 1935) (loss by natural
cause which could not have been prevented by due care).
82. See, e.g., Challenger Minerals, Inc. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., No. 84-C-357-
E (N.D. Okla. Sept. 9, 1986). Some poorly drawn clauses have simply stated "[u]sual
force majeure conditions apply." See, e.g., Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals &
Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
83. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulators Comm'n, 706 F.2d 444,
448 n.8 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
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The lack of a precise definition of force majeure has led to at-
tempts to include "economic considerations" within its meaning. An
agreement's force majeure clause is rarely definitive enough to reject
outright the argument that it excludes economic considerations. s As a
result, courts are often burdened with determining what is an unfore-
seen contingency without clear guidelines upon which to base their
decisions.
The first recorded use of economic force majeure occurred in Ma-
rionneaux v. Smith.8 5 Although the court did not use this term, it ad-
dressed essentially the same issue. In Marionneaux an individual con-
tracted for the right to cut and remove timber from a tract of land
within five years. Because of the world-wide economic depression,
which occurred after the contract had been signed but before the tim-
ber had been harvested, the timber's value had been greatly reduced. If
the purchaser had removed the timber within the five-year period, he
would have suffered a significant loss." Upon the expiration of the
five-year period, the purchaser invoked a clause in the contract that
granted him two additional years in which to remove the timber for
"circumstances beyond his control.' '8 7
The Louisiana Court of Appeals rejected this use of the force
majeure clause.8 It concluded that a financial depression was not en-
compassed by the clause and that a force majeure clause does not ex-
cuse the promisor from performance on the grounds of intervening im-
possibility merely because the performance of a contract is rendered
difficult, burdensome, or unprofitable.8 9
Madeirense Do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co.90 fur-
ther illustrated the underlying reasoning of Marionneaux. In
84. In Golsen v. ONG W., Inc., 756 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Okla. 1988), the parties in-
cluded the ambiguous phrase "failure of gas supply or markets" as an event of force
majeure. The phrase suggests that an economic event could trigger the force majeure
clause.
The trial court concluded that a 26.4% reduction in demand over a two-year period
and a decrease in revenues of $45 million constituted a failure of the markets. Id. at
1212. The appellate court rejected this interpretation on the basis that the inability to
sell a commodity at a profit is not considered to be an event of force majeure, and that
the ability to sell the gas at or above the contract price was irrelevant to whether there
was a "failure of the markets." Id. at 1212-13. The court of appeals correctly recognized
that "lack of market demand as distinguished from absolute demand is a function of
price . . ." Id. at 1213 n.2 (emphasis in original).
85. 163 So. 206 (La. 1935).
86. Id. at 206-07.
87. Id. at 207.
88. Id. at 209.
89. Id. at 208.
90. 147 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945).
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Madeirense a Brazilian company negotiated a contract to sell and de-
liver wood to the United States. Prior to delivery, the company in-
voked the contract's force majeure clause and claimed that war (World
War II) made it impossible to obtain a vessel to deliver the lumber.9 1
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument and noted
that neither the United States nor any South American countries had
entered the war in Europe that had begun a year earlier.92 The court
held that "the lack of ships . . . was a foreseeable risk which plaintiff
willingly took upon itself; and it cannot under such circumstances
plead the defense of 'force majeure.',,
More recently, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission94 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the use of
a force majeure clause under a warranty contract. Gulf had failed to
deliver defined daily quantities of gas to a pipeline. Gulf denied its
liability and attempted to invoke the contract's force majeure clause.
It claimed that routine mechanical repairs of its wells and pipes were
designated in the contract as events of force majeure.5 Gulf claimed
that the quantities called for in the contract would require Gulf to util-
ize all of its fields, which would be impossible because some of its fields
were always undergoing preventative maintenance or experiencing
mechanical failure.
9 6
First, the court considered the meaning of force majeure as used
in a warranty contract. The court held that force majeure events "can
excuse the supplier's nonperformance for events beyond its control
only to the extent that the supplier has shown that it had available
resources to meet its warranty obligation. '9 7 Next, the party invoking
the force majeure clause must show "what action it took to perform
the contract regardless of the occurrence of the excuse."98 Finally, the
court emphasized that the force majeure events must be unforesee-
able.99 The court noted that although an event might initially be un-
foreseeable, subsequent and frequent recurrences might make the
event foreseeable. 00 Thus, a frequent and almost predictable occur-
91. Id. at 401-03.
92. Id. at 403.
93. Id.
94. 706 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
95. Id. at 448-50. The contract provided that "[tihe term 'force majeure' .. shall
mean ... the necessity for making repairs to or alterations of machinery or lines of pipe
...." Id. at 448 n.8.
96. Id, at 449-50.
97. Id. at 452.
98. Id.
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rence removes an event from the realm of force majeure. The court
illustrated this proposition by citing Gulfs inability to keep its fields
producing at one hundred percent capacity and concluded that the fre-
quent mechanical failures that plagued Gulf could not be characterized
as force majeure because of their continued and expected
recurrence.
101
III. COMPARISON OF COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY, FRUSTRATION OF
PURPOSE, MISTAKE, AND FORCE MAJiEURE
The doctrines of impracticability, frustration of purpose, mistake,
and force majeure discharge an obligor from his obligation to perform
a contractual duty when the failure of a basic assumption underlying
the agreement significantly impacts the value of the exchange to one
party. Commercial impracticability emerged from the common-law
doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose'0 2 and the princi-
pal elements remain essentially the same. 0 3 The doctrine of mutual
mistake is also derived from the doctrine of impracticability. 04 These
doctrines arose to prevent unjust enrichment from supervening events
and were united through the judicial principle that the failure to accu-
rately predict future market conditions is not a sufficient basis on
which to grant relief.05
These doctrines are distinguished most clearly by the circum-
stances they attempt to address. Impracticability "focuses on occur-
rences which greatly increase the costs, difficulty, or risk of the party's
performance" 06 while frustration addresses "a party's severe disap-
pointment . . . caused by circumstances which frustrate his principal
purpose for entering the contract."' 0 7 Commercial impracticability,
101. Id. at 454.
102. McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 774 (W. Va. 1984).
103. Compare commercial impracticability, supra notes 14-49 and accompanying
text with frustration of purpose, supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
104. The doctrine of mistake contains two of the same elements as commercial im-
practicability: it requires the mistaken fact to be a basic assumption and it is qualified
by the notion of risk allocation. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Li-
tig., 517 F. Supp. 440, 457 (E.D. Va. 1981).
105. See Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265,
276-78 (7th Cir. 1986) (comparing the doctrines); Resources Inv. Corp. v. Enron Corp.,
669 F. Supp. 1038, 1042-43 (D. Colo. 1987); Sunflower Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil
Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 131, 138-39, 638 P.2d 963, 969-70 (1981).
106. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 73 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(incorrectly citing § 281 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in place of § 261,
which addresses impracticability).
107. Id. (incorrectly citing § 285 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) in
place of § 265, which addresses frustration).
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frustration of purpose, and mistake all discharge an obligor from his
duty of performance. 108
Each of these doctrines is limited by the notions of allocation and
assumption of risk. The doctrine of impracticability requires that the
nonoccurrence of a certain event or fact causing the impracticability be
a basic assumption on which the contract was made.109 The doctrine of
frustration of purpose, like the doctrine of impracticability, requires
the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a basic assumption upon which
the parties relied in making the agreement. 110 Similarly, the doctrine of
mistake of fact requires that the mistake relate to a basic assumption
on which the contract was founded."1
The doctrines of impracticability and frustration, however, differ
from the doctrine of mistake in several important ways. The doctrines
of impracticability and frustration are directed toward hardship. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that a party is excused
from performance when a supervening event renders his performance
impracticable. 12 The Forward to Tentative Draft No. 10 of the Re-
statement (Second) states: "Cases involving impracticability or frus-
tration also involve mistake but to the extent that the focus is on hard-
ship to the adversely affected party [they receive different
treatment]."13
The doctrines of impracticability and frustration each address dif-
ferent types of hardship. Impracticability focuses on acts that signifi-
cantly increase the costs, risks, or difficulties associated with a con-
tract, while frustration grants relief for contracts that could be
performed but for which no purpose exists to complete the contract." 4
The principles regarding foreseeability and assumption of risk, applica-
ble under the doctrine of commercial impracticability, are also applica-
ble under the doctrine of frustration of purpose."
5
Both the doctrine of commercial frustration and the doctrine of
impossibility of performance attempt to address the effects of super-
vening events upon the parties' contractual obligations. Under com-
mercial frustration, performance remains possible when the reason the
parties entered into the agreement has been negated by the super-
108. Id. at 70.
109. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 comment a (1981).
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) (forward to Tentative Draft
10, 1975).
114. Compare Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916)
with Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944).
115. Lloyd, 25 Cal. 2d at 52, 153 P.2d at 50.
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vening event. The purpose or object of the agreement must be totally
or almost totally destroyed. Under the doctrine of impossibility of per-
formance, however, performance must be undertaken unless it is ren-
dered impossible by law, by the other party, or by an act of God (force
majeure). Similarly, force majeure only excuses performance if per-
formance is not practicable.
Each of these doctrines may exist within the same time period.
The doctrines of frustration, impracticability, and mistake are applica-
ble to occurrences that occur after the execution of the agreement.1 6
Thus the "mistake" could occur at, or subsequent to, execution of the
contract. Similarly, the Restatement recognizes that the doctrines of
impracticability and frustration may exist at the time of execution and
need not arise from the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event after
the execution of the agreement.
117
If one or more of these doctrines is applied improperly, the par-
ties' risk allocations will be altered. Improper allocation of the element
of risk is a serious concern because risk allocation is the primary reason
for entering a contract." 8 Altering the allocation of risk in a manner
different from the intentions of the parties defeats the purpose of the
contract.
Force majeure is most similar to the doctrine of impracticability
because both doctrines allow relief when a supervening event has seri-
ously disrupted performance to such a degree that performance would
place an undue burden on one of the parties or to such an extent that
the underlying object of the contract is no longer practicable.1 9 Fi-
nally, in each of these doctrines the burden of proof is placed upon the
party seeking to avoid performance.
20
The importance of these doctrines and their interrelationship with
each other is revealed by the following illustrations. Although the con-
tracting parties may have included a force majeure clause in their con-
tract and attempted to address potential U.C.C. problems, a problem
may arise that is not directly addressed by the contract's force majeure
116. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 71 (W.D. Pa.
1980). But see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp.
1319, 1327 (E.D. La. 1981) and Shear v. National Rifle Ass'n of Am., 606 F.2d 1251, 1260
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (both citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 293 comment a
(1981) for the proposition that the doctrine of mistake applies only to the parties' beliefs
at the time of the making of the contract).
117. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 499 F. Supp. at 72 (citing both the first and second
Restatement of Contracts).
118. Id. at 61.
119. As to force majeure, see International Minerals & Chems. Corp. v. Llano, 770
F.2d 879, 885 (10th Cir. 1989).
120. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440,
450 (E.D. Va. 1981).
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clause or by the U.C.C.
To illustrate this problem, consider the following:
Illustration 1. On January 1 National Airlines and ABC Oil enter
into a contract for National to purchase and ABC to sell two million
gallons of aviation fuel for $1.00 a gallon, the market price on January
1, during the upcoming calendar year. On August 1 one Middle East
country attacks another, creating a sudden rise in the price of aviation
fuel to $1.50 a gallon. ABC's oil does not originate from either of these
two countries and is not refined in the Middle East.
The sudden rise in oil prices causes ABC to lose money it could
have otherwise made by selling the fuel at the new higher price. ABC
attempts to void its contractual obligations based on the contract's
force majeure clause, mistake, commercial impracticability, and frus-
tration of purpose under the U.C.C.
Like the Gulf case, commercial impracticability is inappropriate in
this illustration because performance has not become so unreasonable
that it would result in a great injustice. Furthermore, it is not impracti-
cable to complete the contract. ABC's wells, production, and refining
facilities were unaffected. Finally, there was not an occurrence of a
contingency, the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on
which the contract was made as required under the U.C.C. Given the
volatile nature of the Middle East and because ABC was not depen-
dent on the Middle East for its fuel production, it would be extremely
difficult for ABC to argue successfully that the noninvasion of one mid-
dle east country by another was a basic assumption underlying the
contract.
Frustration of purpose is equally inapplicable because the purpose
of the contract has not been frustrated. ABC can still deliver the fuel
and National still needs a source of fuel.
ABC is also unlikely to prevail on a claim of mistake. To reform or
rescind a contract on the basis of mistake, both parties at the time of
execution must have made a mistake as to a basic assumption that has
a material effect on the contract. Relief will not be granted if the mis-
take was unilateral. Although ABC might make this point, National
will correctly argue that it realized fuel prices might increase sharply
and that was its reason for entering into a long-term contract. Conse-
quently, it would be very difficult for ABC to demonstrate a mutual
mistake.
ABC might be entitled to relief under the contract's force majeure
clause, but it is unlikely. Any determination will depend on the exact
wording of the clause. Most clauses provide relief for acts of war, civil
disturbance, acts of God, etc. Although at first glance these may seem
applicable, ABC itself was not directly affected. ABC's wells and refin-
eries were not located in the Middle East. ABC can argue that it was
affected by a war or civil disturbance, but to prevail, it would have to
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prove it was directly and seriously impacted by the war.
To illustrate the effects of fluctuations in the world's economy that
might seriously impact the contracting parties without affecting the ac-
tual price of the underlying commodity, consider the following:
Illustration 2. On June 1 ABC Refining Co. enters into a contract
to purchase oil from Telmex, the national oil company of Mexico. The
contract requires ABC to purchase one million barrels of oil from
Telmex at 15,000 pesos a barrel, the equivalent of twenty dollars a
barrel, (at a conversion rate of 750 pesos to the dollar) which is the
existing world market rate. By December 1 due to political and eco-
nomic instability in Mexico, the conversion rate rises to 3000 pesos to
the dollar, giving ABC a real purchase price of $5 a barrel. Telmex is
now effectively losing $15 a barrel in comparison to the world market
price, which has remained constant at $20 a barrel. Telmex now seeks
to avoid its contractual obligations.
In Illustration 2, Telmex would have a tenuous claim under the
doctrine of impracticability. Telmex's actual cost of production did not
increase from June 1 to December 1. Similarly, the world price for a
barrel of oil has remained constant at twenty dollars a barrel. The only
change has been in the exchange ratio, which has risen from 750 pesos
to the dollar to 3000 pesos to the dollar. The driving force in this
change was not related to the product or production costs, but rather
to currency fluctuations caused by political and economic instability.
The doctrine of impracticability may incorrectly appear to be rele-
vant on first impression. Under section 2-615(a) of the U.C.C., Telmex
must prove the contracting parties assumed the non-occurrence of cur-
rency fluctuations. Its argument is founded on the belief that because
the parties had not made provisions for currency fluctuations, the con-
tract should be rescinded. This is a difficult argument to prove because
the world's currencies fluctuate constantly. If anything, it is likely that
the peso-to-dollar ratio would fluctuate and that the parties wanted to
agree on a fixed price to avoid any risk.
Section 2-615(a) of the U.C.C. states that an increase in price
alone is not enough to invoke the doctrine of impracticability. For a
court to rescind a contract due to impracticability, a price increase
must be significant. In Illustration 2, Telmex's costs have remained
constant and the contractual price should be enough to pay Telmex's
costs, Which presumably, are not affected by the exchange rate. Thus,
because the actual cost of performance has not increased, Telmex's ar-
gument is very weak.
Currency fluctuations are similar to the effects of inflation. If
Telmex had executed an agreement for a fixed price which was made
unprofitable due to a high level of inflation in Mexico, Telmex would
not be allowed to avoid its contractual obligations. In both cases,
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Telmex should have had the contract priced in dollars to avoid poten-
tial problems.
Telmex could argue further that the parties assumed there would
not be political and economic instability in Mexico during the term of
the contract. Telmex could argue that if ABC believed there would be
instability, ABC would not have contracted with a Mexican corpora-
tion. Furthermore, most parties that contract with another party as-
sume the stability of the country in which the other party is located.
This argument will probably fail because these are clearly the types of
risk reasonable parties consider.
Contracting parties usually do not assume the risk of political and
economic instability. Such risk is typically addressed in an agreement's
force majeure clause which covers acts of civil disturbance, civil unrest,
etc. Depending on the level of the instability, Telmex may be able to
avoid meeting its contractual obligations under the agreement's force
majeure clause. Telmex's ability to do so would rest upon the actual
wording of the agreement's force majeure clause. This possibility illus-
trates the need for a contract's force majeure clause to specifically ex-
clude both currency fluctuations and the underlying economic consid-
erations to protect both parties interests.
A more difficult problem arises when the facts of a particular situ-
ation do not permit a clear distinction among the different doctrines.
For example:
Illustration 3. Buyer, a gourmet grocery store, contracts prior to
the growing season with Seller, a farmer in Fulton County, Georgia, to
buy ten tons of Vidalia onions from Seller. Because of an unforeseen
drought, Seller produces only five tons. Furthermore, Buyer and Seller
then discover that Vidalia onions can only be grown in Vidalia
County, Georgia. Thus, the onions grown by Seller are not Vidalia on-
ions, which causes their value to Buyer to decrease significantly.
Under the facts of Illustration 3, first impression indicates that the
doctrines of impracticability, frustration of purpose, mistake, and force
majeure may all apply.
As to commercial impracticability, Seller's nondelivery was a di-
rect result of the occurrence of a contingency, the drought, the nonoc-
currence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made. Given that the parties did not perceive the possibility of drought
and the contract called for a particular variety of onions, which might
not be easily acquired by Seller if the drought was wide spread, com-
mercial impracticability appears to apply.
A closer examination is required to determine the applicability of
this doctrine. What effect has the drought had on the price of Vidalia
onions? Can they be obtained at any price? If they can be obtained at
a higher price, will this cause a great injustice to Seller? To what ex-
[Vol. 42
24
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss2/5
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
tent can performance occur? The cost to Seller to cover his contractual
obligations will dictate whether the court will impose the doctrine of
commercial impractibility. Obviously, the greater the burden to Seller
the greater the likelihood the doctrine will be imposed. Given previous
case law, it appears that the Seller has a strong argument.
The relevance of this doctrine is further questioned, however, by
the fact that Seller was physically unable to grow Vidalia onions on its
property. Thus, in examining Seller's burden to meet its contractual
obligations, the court most likely will look to how much of an addi-
tional burden the drought imposed on Seller, given that Seller would
have had to purchase the Vidalia onions on the open market whether
or not the drought had occurred.
The doctrine of frustration of purpose may also apply. To deter-
mine its relevance, one must look to the effects of the drought and the
inability of Seller to grow Vidalia onions on its property. Because
Seller's performance has not become worthless to Buyer, Seller would
be unable to invoke the doctrine of frustration of purpose. The drought
was not responsible for frustrating Buyer's purpose. After the contract
had been made, Seller's principal purpose had been substantially frus-
trated through no fault of its own by the drought, the nonoccurrence of
which was a basic assumption when the agreement was made.
However, Buyer could make a more compelling argument. Al-
though Seller could deliver the five tons of onions grown, they were not
Vidalia onions and, thus, had little or no value to Buyer. The doctrine
of frustration of purpose would thus apply to Buyer because Seller's
performance, even to the extent it is able to perform, is worthless to
Buyer because he contracted for Vidalia onions.
A stronger argument may be made, however, that the doctrine of
mistake under section 294 of the Restatement directly applies. Refor-
mation or rescission on the grounds of mutual mistake requires proof
by clear and convincing evidence that at the time the agreement was
made, both parties had mistaken beliefs that had a material effect on
the agreed exchange of performances. In such a case, the adversely af-
fected party may void the agreement unless it assumed the risk of
mistake.
Both Seller and Buyer had a mistaken belief about what consti-
tuted a Vidalia onion. At the time they entered the agreement, they
believed that Seller could grow Valdalia onions, which have a premium
market value. Unfortunately, this was impossible because Seller's prop-
erty was located outside of Vidalia County, Georgia. As a result, both
parties were mistaken at the time the agreement was made as to a ba-
sic assumption on which their agreement was founded, and this had a
material effect on the agreement.
This mistaken assumption about the ability of Seller to produce
Vidalia onions and what constitutes a Vidalia onion resulted in the
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failure of the contracting parties to have a meeting of the minds re-
garding the essence of the agreement, the ability of Seller to produce
Vidalia onions. This material mistake was not one of prophecy or opin-
ion related to a certain event and went to a material portion of the
agreement. The doctrine's applicability, however, is founded upon the
assumption that the party seeking to void the contract did not assume
the risk of mistake.
Finally, the doctrine of force majeure may be relevant. Seller
could make a strong argument that the drought was an act of God,
which was unforeseeable, and that performance is excused under the
agreement's force majeure clause. The drought prevented the Seller
from producing a full crop of onions. The potential applicability of the
agreement's force majeure clause depends on its wording. Most force
majeure clauses include language that addresses nonperformance, how-
ever, because of the weather, acts of God, or other acts of nature that
are outside the control of the contracting parties.
If Buyer brought a breach of contract action against Seller, Buyer
would certainly argue that the agreement's force majeure clause did
not apply. If the drought had not occurred, Seller would still have been
unable to fulfill its obligations under the agreement. Seller's perform-
ance was directly limited by its inability to grow Vidalia onions. Seller
most likely would argue that, although it was unable to grow Valdalia
onions on its own property, it would have been able to purchase Vid-
alia onions on the open market to meet its contractual obligations if
not for the drought. A court might fail to allow the rescission of the
contract based on the agreement's force majeure clause unless the
court accepted Seller's argument that, but for the drought, it could
have met its contractual obligations.
IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVEINTION
The continued restrictive use of the doctrines of commercial im-
practicability, frustration, mistake, and force majeure is compelled by
the tenets of contract law and the economic structure of this country.
Case law, as evolved from the common law of a capitalist society, al-
lows the implementation of such doctrines only in egregious cases. To
do otherwise is contrary to the principles of traditional legal reasoning,




121. Wheeling Valley Coal Corp. v. Mead, 186 F.2d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 1950) (the
court defined force majeure, as it relates to coal mining, as "things which directly and of
themselves prevent the carrying on of mining operations, not acts or causes which in
conjunction with others merely render such operations unprofitable.").
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The reluctance to implement these doctrines ensures the sanctity
of contractual agreements. Contractual agreements provide needed sta-
bility in America's economic markets. Contract law cannot be subject
to the capricious interpretation of a complaining party. By accepting
greater use of these doctrines, courts threaten the economic stability
created by long-term contracts.
122
Businesses undertake long-range strategic planning based on the
security provided by their long-term contracts. If a business could not
enforce its long-term agreements, it would not be able to rely on its
long-range planning to function efficiently. Corporations rely on long-
term agreements to provide certainty and stability in their operations
and planning. Without the protections offered by existing contract law,
all parties relying on long-term contracts would suffer serious economic
disruptions to their business.
To understand the theoretical effects of a more activist judiciary,
assume that courts expanded the practice of intervening to rescind or
reform contracts in the event of unforeseen economic fluctuations.
Commercial parties would become hesitant to enter into long-term
contracts if they thought such contracts would be rescinded or re-
formed if the terms of the contract became too onerous on the other
party. Contracts of shorter duration would become more prevalent be-
cause, theoretically, a shorter time-frame would limit the risk to each
party and be more acceptable to the judiciary.
Because a manufacturer could not guarantee a stable price for its
raw materials over a long period of time, it would bear a much higher
degree of risk. This risk would directly impact its operations and would
likely lead to increased prices of its products for the purchaser. The
manufacturer would become much more sensitive to small shocks in
,the price of its raw materials and would be unable to limit its risks
through long-term contracts. Furthermore, it would be unable to main-
tain a stable price for its goods if it were continually subject to price
changes in its raw materials, Recurrent price changes would also pre-
vent a manufacturer from making the assumptions necessary to under-
take long-term planning.
Given an increase in the price of its raw materials, a manufacturer
would be forced to act in one of two ways. It could either raise the
prices of its products or lower its profit margin. If the manufacturer
raised its prices, it might lose market share depending on the elasticity
of its product. The possibility exists, however, that the manufacturer
would be unable to do either and still remain profitable. In either situ-
122. See, e.g., Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 940, 952,
461 N.E.2d 1049, 1059 (1984) (noting that providing relief to parties who suffer from a
change in market prices would abolish contract law).
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ation, society would bear the burden of increased prices and possibly
increased unemployment if the manufacturer were forced out of
business.
To argue that the failure of the manufacturer's business can be
justified because it was "inefficient" is flawed because the nation's
economy does not operate in a perfectly competitive market. 23 If the
manufacturer raises its prices, society as a whole will be forced to pay a
greater price for the same goods. If the manufacturer ceases to conduct
business because it is no longer able to do so profitably, unemployment
will increase and competition will decrease.
Golsen v. ONG Western, Inc.124 provides an illustration of the
problems that might arise if courts adopt a more aggressive approach
toward intervention. In Golsen the owners of a natural gas well sued to
enforce the "take or pay" clause125 in their contract with ONG. The
contract required ONG to purchase all of the gas produced by the Gol-
sen well for a period of fifteen years and to pay for the gas even if
ONG did not "take" it.126 During the term of the contract the market
for natural gas became extremely volatile and made it unprofitable for
ONG to purchase the gas. ONG claimed that it should be excused from
performing its contractual obligations under the language of the con-
tract's force majeure clause.
127
The trial court held that the force majeure clause excused ONG
from its obligation to pay for the gas not taken.12 8 The court concluded
that a significant decrease in demand for gas by ONG's customers over
123. A perfectly competitive market would require (1) all buyers and sellers to have
equal access to information and be aware of all market conditions, (2) all products to be
homogenous, (3) all producers to be small enough so as not to influence price or manipu-
late the market, and (4) all parts to be free to enter or leave the market (i.e., no entry or
exit barriers). REYNOLDS, MACROECONOMICS 4 (3d ed. 1979).
124. 756 P.2d 1209 (Okla. 1988).
125. A "take or pay" clause is found in many oil and natural gas purchase agree-
ments. It requires the purchaser to take a certain amount of gas or oil, or pay for the oil
or gas if he does not take it. The seller is guaranteed a stream of revenue, and the pur-
chaser is assured a source of oil or gas. The purchaser bears the risk of market demand.
A "take or pay" clause ensures that the seller will receive the agreed upon price for the
contract quantity each year. See, e.g., Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipe
Line Co., 813 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1987); Day v. Tenneco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 233, 234
(S.D. Miss. 1988). These contracts compensate the seller for being ready to deliver the
maximum quantity of oil or gas at all times, and they protect the seller against a require-
ments contract in which the buyer's demands were too low. See International Minerals
Chem. Corp. v. Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1015 (1986). See generally 4 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYsRS, OIL AND GAS LAw § 724.5 (1988).
126. Golsen, 756 P.2d at 1210.
127. Id. at 1210-11.
128. Id. at 1210.
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a two year period, constituted events of force majeure.129 The court
recognized ONG's inability to sell the gas at a profit as an act of force
majeure and expanded the traditional meaning of the term.
13 0
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the lower court's decision.13 ' The supreme court strongly rejected the
lower court's application of the doctrine of force majeure and stated
that the inability of ONG to sell the gas at a profit was not within the
realm of force majeure.
13 2
When the court interpreted the force majeure clause within the
agreement, the court cautioned that any repugnancy should be recon-
ciled, if possible, "by such an interpretation as will give some effect to
the repugnant clause which is subordinate to the general intent and
purposes of the whole contract." 131 In Golsen, ONG's interpretation of
the force majeure clause was repugnant to the general meaning of the
contract.1 4 The central object of the agreement was to buy and sell
gas, and the take or pay provisions were integral to it. ONG, the pur-
chaser, obtained a steady source of gas at a fixed price while Golsen,
the seller, obtained a sure market for its gas. The seller agreed to
forego selling gas to other purchasers in return for ONG's promise to
pay for the gas even if ONG did not take it.
The Golsen court, recognized the incentives for both parties, and
held that "[a] particular clause will not control if it is violative of the
parties' general intent even though persuasive in isolation."23 5 Thus, an
expansive interpretation of the force majeure clause was not proper
because it would have contravened the express purpose of the contract.
In evaluating the application of these doctrines to a particular sit-
uation, courts place emphasis on whether the supervening event was
unforeseen. 13 "Unforeseen" is defined as "not expected."' 3 7 The Gulf
court also required that the event occur infrequently."38 Thus, a hurri-
129. Id. at 1211-12.
130. Profitability has not been a traditional justification for invoking the doctrine of
force majeure. See id. at 1212; cf. Morrison v. W.L. Green Comm'n Co., 61 Okla. 287,
161 P. 218 (1916) (evidence indicating expense as the reason for nonperformance may be
included). A force majeure clause is rarely intended by the parties to address "market
forces" and in such cases, a direct reference is made to them.
131. Golsen, 756 P.2d at 1220.
132. Id. at 1212-13 (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 455 (1932)).
133. Id. at 1213.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1214 (citing United States ex rel. Bachman & Keffer Constr. Co. v. H. G.
Cozad Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1963)).
136. For a discussion of impracticability, see supra text accompanying notes 27-28;
for a discussion of frustration of purpose, see supra text accompanying note 58.
137. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1530 (6th ed. 1990).
138. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 706 F.2d 444, 453-54 (3d
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cane in October in Florida would not be considered an act of force
majeure, but a hurricane in Alaska would. This is the case with eco-
nomic fluctuations. Economic fluctuations, such as recessions and cor-
responding upswings, have long been recognized as cyclical.'39 These
changes, while unpredictable, are not unforeseen and are to be ex-
pected. Even assuming that such changes are unforeseen, they are not
infrequent so they fail to meet the definition provided in Gulf.
The cyclical nature of the economy in both the United States and
in the world arguably should bar the application of such doctrines to
economic fluctuations. 14 0 Viewed in conjunction with the imprecise and
uncertain nature of economic forecasting, the cyclical nature of the
economy makes the term "economic force majeure" an oxymoron. Rec-
ognized unpredictability cannot be unforeseen.
Because the economy fluctuates, even major changes in the eco-
nomic climate do not necessarily justify judicial intervention. '4 This
irreconcilable contradiction between impracticability, frustration, and
mistake, and the cyclical nature of the economy, dictates the rejection
of the broader application of these doctrines. Economic fluctuations
have not traditionally been included within the commonly accepted
meaning of such doctrines because their repetitious nature prevents
them from being considered unforeseen. Accordingly, a broader inter-
pretation to include them should specifically be agreed to by the con-
tracting parties before they can be applied. If a contract's force
majeure clause does not include a provision regarding economic fluctu-
ations, it must be presumed that the parties intended to assign risk
through the pricing mechanism contained in the agreement.
42
Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co. dealt with the issue of foreseeabil-
ity.143 In Foster the court denied an oil company's motion to rescind a
royalty contract because it did not contain a price escalation clause.
44
The court noted that if a party can perform the obligated action, the
party will be held responsible even though performance may become
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984).
139. See, e.g., M. EDGMEND, MACROECONoMIcs THEORY AND POLICY 369-72 (1979).
140. Id.; see also Gulf Oil Corp., 706 F.2d at 453-54 (it is possible to describe accu-
rately an event at its initial occurrence as unforeseeable, and later, because of the regu-
larity with which it occurs, to find that such a description no longer applies).
1,41. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441-42 (S.D.
Fla. 1975) (economic instability in the oil industry is foreseeable); Groseth Int'l, Inc. v.
Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 167 (S.D. 1987) (economic depression in the agriculture
economy is foreseeable).
142. See Foster v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1964) (by failing to in-
clude adjustment mechanism in contract, a party assumed the risk that price increases
would adversely affect its ability to perform).
143. Id.
1,44. Id. at 489.
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difficult or impossible.'45 This is true especially when the party "might
have foreseen the difficulty and impossibility., 4 6 Such reasoning re-
stricts the use of these doctrines to very limited situations.
In evaluating whether an event is foreseeable, it is necessary to
distinguish between whether an event is foreseeable and whether it is
contemplated. To prevent the possible invocation of the doctrines of
impracticability, mistake, frustration, and force majeure, an event
must only have been foreseeable, regardless of whether it was actually
contemplated by the parties. 47 This lesser standard arguably makes it
much more difficult to invoke these doctrines because fluctuations in
market price are reasonably foreseeable.
These fluctuations that create the element of risk serve as the mo-
tivating force for entering into long-term contracts. All contracts in-
volve risk. Risk is inherent in their nature. A fixed-price contract ex-
plicitly allocates the element of risk between contracting parties.2
48
The seller bears the risk that the underlying commodity will increase
in price, forcing the sale below the existing market price. The pur-
chaser, on the other hand, bears the risk that falling prices will result
in an obligation to purchase the commodities above the existing mar-
ket price. 49 The contract price reflects the degree of risk borne by ei-
ther party.150
Arguably, the purpose of a contract is the allocation and shifting
of risk.15 Absent evidence to the contrary, the promisor is responsible
for bearing any loss resulting from an inability to forecast future mar-
ket conditions accurately. 5 2 The promisor's failure to provide contrac-
tual protections against that risk is considered an unconditional obliga-
145. Id.
146. Id. (quoting Ellwood v. Nutex Oil Co., 148 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941)).
147. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 991-92
(5th Cir. 1976) (promisor presumed to have agreed to bear loss occasioned by event fore-
seeable at time of contracting) (citing Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153 P.2d 47, 50
(1944)).




151. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 61 (W.D. Pa.
1980).
152. See Sabine Corp. v. ONG W., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 1157, 1179 (W.D. Okla. 1989);
cf. John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569, 1572 (D. Kan. 1986) ("A
general principle of contract law is that conipetent parties may make contracts on their
own terms, provided such contracts are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy and
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tion to perform."5 3
Negotiating parties are expected to recognize that market condi-
tions are volatile and subject to change. 154 Although one party may
have assumed a risk associated with the transaction, it was free to allo-
cate the risk to willing third parties.
Parties that do not wish to assume risk can limit their potential
liability through a number of contractual methods available in a free
market economy. For example, one method to limit potential liability
is to obtain puts, 5 5 calls, 56 or other protective measures. 57 Parties
may not only provide for the risk of the underlying transaction, they
can also minimize tangential risks.15  The economic cost of such mea-
sures is usually quite small in light of the risk avoided.
The ability of a party to control its risk justifies limiting judicial
intervention to only the most egregious situations. Not only have
courts recognized the ability of a party to limit its risk, but in order to
recover under these doctrines, some have imposed the requirement
that a party must have attempted to limit its risk. 5 ' Such reasoning
correctly limits the recovery of a party that fails to take reasonably
prudent measures to protect its interests. To do otherwise would re-
ward negligence, because the injured party could seek to recover de-
153. Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng'rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1985)
("If the risk of the occurrence of the contingency was foreseeable, that risk is tacitly
assigned to the seller."); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957,
992 (5th Cir. 1976); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441 (S.D.
Fla. 1975); Barbarossa-Sons, Inc. v. Iten Chevrolet, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 655, 659-61 (Minn.
1978).
154. Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Energy Coop., Inc., 122 Ill. App. 3d 940, 952, 461
N.E.2d 1049, 1059 (1984).
155. A "put" option is the right, but not the obligation, to sell a particular commod-
ity at a set time in the future at a set price. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
156. A "call" option is the right, but not the obligation, to buy a particular commod-
ity at a set time in the future at a set price. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 204 (6th ed. 1990).
157. These may include, but are not necessarily limited to, insurance, subcontract-
ing a party's obligations under the contract, arbitrage, and if applicable, buying and sell-
ing commodity futures agreements. One widely recognized risk limiting device is "price
indexing," which can be tailored to any situation. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v.
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 63 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
158. Tangential risks, although incidental to the object of the contract, could seri-
ously affect the contracting parties. The most prevalent of such risks is the risk of cur-
rency fluctuations when one pays in a foreign currency. If the exchange rate fluctuates
and the contract price remains constant, the buyer or seller's profit margin could be
significantly increased or decreased depending on the direction of fluctuation.
159. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.
1976); see also Madeirense Do Brasil. S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399,
403 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 325 U.S. 861 (1945); Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54, 153
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spite its own inaction.
The corollary to this reasoning is that a party which undertakes
reasonable actions to protect its interests will be protected from those
events it did not reasonably foresee. Under no circumstances, when
risks are foreseeable, should a court rewrite a contract to achieve what
it believes is an equitable result. 6 0 Presumably, the parties enjoyed
equal bargaining positions when they negotiated and executed the con-
tract. A buyer has the right to rely on the seller to supply the con-
tracted goods regardless of any price change.' 6'
V. THE REASONABLY PRUDENT PERSON STANDARD
In evaluating an alleged event of economic fluctuation to deter-
mine whether judicial intervention is justifiable, courts should utilize a
"reasonably prudent person" standard. Such a standard would go be-
yond a "reasonable man" standard,' 62 to hold contracting parties to the
standards of a reasonably prudent person. Thus, contracting parties
would be expected to adhere to the standards of an individual exper-
ienced in a specific type of business.' 6'
The acceptance of a reasonably prudent person standard in long-
term contractual agreements is analogous to the existing use of such a
standard in securities law and negligence cases. The reasonably pru-
dent person standard is a logical extension of the "ordinarily prudent
person" standard provided for under the Revised Model Business Cor-
160. Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminum Int'l Corp., 719 F.2d 992, 999
(9th Cir. 1983) ("[I]t would violate fundamental principles of contract law to use section
2-615 of the U.C.C. to rewrite the contract to which the parties agreed."); see also Mor-
gan v. Mobil Oil Corp., 726 F.2d 1474, 1477 (10th Cir. 1984); 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 598 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
161. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 439 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
see also Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293-94 (7th Cir.
1974); American Trading and Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 942
(2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966); Whitlock
Corp. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 602, 606 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 815 (1958);
Perry v. Champlain Oil Co., 101 N.H. 97, 99, 134 A.2d 65, 66 (1957); Maple Farms, Inc. v.
City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
162. A defendant must meet the "reasonable man" standard to avoid liability in a
negligence action. It requires an individual to exercise the same degree of care and cau-
tion as a "reasonable man" under all of the same circumstances, including the foresee-
ability of harm to the individual. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 173-93 (5th ed. 1984).
163. See Challenger Minerals, Inc., No. 84-C-357-E, slip op. at 15 (N.D. Okla. Sept.
9, 1986) (the negotiating parties are expected to have an awareness of market conditions
as changeable rather than stable); see also Coquina Oil v. Transwestern Pipeline Co., No.
86-562-M Civil, slip. op. at 14 (D.N.M. Sept. 19, 1986).
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poration Act (RMBCA)164 and the reasonable man standard utilized in
other areas of the law.
Under the RMBCA, a corporation's directors are held to the stan-
dard of care of an ordinarily prudent person in a like position under
similar circumstances. 165 Several cases have held this standard to be
the same standard of care used by the director to conduct his own per-
sonal business. 1'6
The official comment to section 8.30 of the Model Business Corpo-
ration Act, which discusses the phrase "ordinarily prudent person,"
recognizes that it "embodies long traditions of common law.' 6 7 Thus it
is a standard on which directors can be easily judged. This reasoning
applies to long-term contracts for which a reasonably prudent person
standard can be applied easily. In contrast, an "ordinarily prudent bus-
inessman" standard reflects an undefined degree of expertise that can-
not be articulated. 168 An "ordinarily prudent person" standard does
not reflect any lesser standard, because the official comment acknowl-
edges the requirement that a director be innovative as well as possess
common sense, practical wisdom, and informed judgment.6 9
These attributes are analogous to contracting parties because they
must possess the foresight, common sense, practical wisdom, and in-
formed judgment to take all reasonable action to limit potential losses.
Thus, although an individual may lack expertise or business experience
in a particular area, the individual will not be excused form exercising
the level of common sense, practical wisdom, and informed judgment
exercised by an ordinarily prudent person. 70
Closely analogous to these standards is the reasonable man stan-
dard utilized in securities law to determine whether a fact or piece of
information is material.17 ' To determine whether a fact is material, the
court considers whether a reasonable man would attach importance to
a particular fact in making his investment decision. 17 2 The courts do
not use a reasonable businessman standard, but rather ask what an
ordinarily prudent and reasonable person would think is important.
164. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRp. Acv § 8.30(a)(2) (1984).
165. Id.
166. Schein v. Caesar's World, Inc., 491 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838
(1974); In re Illinois Valley Acceptance Corp., 531 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Harman
v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149 (D. Kan. 1974), afl'd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975).




171. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd and rev'd on other grounds, 446
F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), on remand, 331 F. Supp. 671, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
172. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.; 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
[Vol. 42
34
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss2/5
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
The use of this standard helps to avoid problems in interpretation.
The judge can use settled case law, and the jury can use its perception,
to determine liability. A simple and well-articulated standard allows
for ease of use.
The use of this standard is also justified by the use of the reasona-
ble man standard in negligence cases. Under tort law, the reasonable
man standard is used to determine whether the individual seeking re-
covery discharged his duty to exercise reasonable care for his own
safety.173 This is directly analogous to the situation presented by con-
tracting parties. Did the entity seeking recovery exercise due care to
limit its contractual risks? If it did not act in a reasonably prudent
manner or as a reasonably prudent person, it should not be entitled to
recover. In both negligence actions and contractual obligations, a party
seeking recovery would be held to the same standard. This would cre-
ate one consistent standard that would transcend several areas of the
law. By recognizing such a standard, courts would avoid inconsistent
applications of the law that result in inequitable results.
In business transactions, commercial parties have often been im-
puted to have a greater degree of knowledge, or sophistication, than
consumers and have been held to a higher standard. This is consistent
with the new standard. Individuals operating in the business world
should take the same precautions to limit their risk as do all reasona-
ble persons. To do otherwise risks contradicting traditional legal
reasoning.
A reasonably prudent person standard would incorporate tradi-
tional reasoning, utilizing these standards in closely analogous areas.
At least one decision has equated a reasonably prudent man standard
with an ordinary prudent man standard, strongly implying that the
two are synonymous.
174
Each of these standards is objective in nature and seeks to draw
upon well-developed common law, thereby avoiding interpretations in
judgment. A reasonably prudent person standard attempts to avoid
problems that may arise when an individual lacks business experience
or expertise in a particular area. Under this proposed standard, ex-
isting case law would not excuse an individual from exercising common
sense and informed judgment.17 Finally, an objective standard, such as
a reasonably prudent man standard, allows easy application and re-
view. A court would compare the actions taken by the party seeking
rescission to those that would have been taken by a reasonably prudent
173. B&B Insulation, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 583
F.2d 1364, 1370 (5th Cir. 1978).
174. Missouri, Ky. & Tenn. Ry. v. Hannig, 91 Tex. 347, 43 S.W. 508 (1897).
175. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.30 official comment (1984).
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person. The inquiry would focus primarily on whether the impact of an
intervening event could have been avoided or foreseen by a reasonably
prudent person.
For example, businessmen selling products abroad are often ex-
posed to a currency risk because payment, in a foreign currency will
take place sometime after delivery in the future. The businessman
bears the risk that the foreign currency may depreciate against the dol-
lar, thereby reducing or even eliminating his profit. A reasonably pru-
dent person will protect himself against any possible depreciation, or
increase his contract price to reflect the risk of such depreciation. It is
extremely unlikely that a businessman would be able to avoid his con-
tractual obligations through economic force majeure, commercial im-
practicability, mistake, frustration, or any other legal theory because of
his failure to cover his currency risk. The reasonably prudent person
standard is an equitable model that recognizes the protections identi-
fied by the Restatement, U.C.C., and existing case law. At the same
time, it requires the parties to protect themselves and encourages them
to think about the economic assumptions underlying their agreement.
Such expectations are reasonable, being founded upon the business
practices of a reasonably prudent person. Therefore, adoption of the
standard would eliminate frivolous claims while allowing parties to re-
cover for truly unforeseeable events.
A reasonably prudent person standard can also be applied easily
by the judiciary. The standard is based on common sense. The court
would only have to consider one question: What actions would a rea-
sonably prudent person take to protect his interests under the agree-
ment in issue? The test is straightforward and uncomplicated. By
closely reviewing the actions the party took to protect itself in light of
the existing dangers, the court can easily determine whether the party
acted in a reasonably prudent manner.
VI. AVOIDANCE OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
To limit judicial intervention, contracting parties can undertake a
number of actions to ensure the sanctity of their agreement. When one
drafts an agreement, he should include specific language that will limit
the judiciary's discretion.
Existing case law has upheld the right of contracting parties to
draft specific and detailed force majeure clauses that reflect the nu-
ances of their specific transactions. 17 6 By specifically defining the
176. See, e.g., Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Kaiser Aluminum Int'l Corp., 719 F.2d
992, 997 (9th Cir. 1983); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 601 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978); Tomlinson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co.,
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meaning and application of a contract's force majeure clause, courts
will be reluctant to impose a broader meaning. 1  Courts also tend to
give effect to specific exculpations contained in a force majeure clause
rather than more general language contained in the same clause."78
Consequently, every force majeure clause should be drafted tightly
and include a disclaimer that the clause does not excuse performance
for unforeseen changes in the economic assumptions underlying the
transaction.'7"
Every contract should also contain language which clearly states
that the pricing provisions of the agreement reflect the allocation and
acceptance of risk by one or both parties. By including such a state-
ment the parties will negate the requirements under U.C.C. section 2-
177 Cal. App. 2d 462, 2 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1960); cf. S.L. Jones & Co. v. Bond, 191 Cal. 551,
555, 217 P. 725, 727 (1923) (nonperformance not excused when the party could have
drafted an exculpatory provision into the contract but failed to do so).
Courts have generally rejected, however, the ability of the parties to waive the pro-
tections provided by the U.C.C. if such a waiver would deny a party reasonable protec-
tion. See, e.g., Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D. Ill.
1974). Nevertheless, at least two circuits have allowed contracting parties to provide for
exemptions broader than those provided for under § 2-615 of the U.C.C. See Interpetrol
Bermuda, 719 F.2d at 999; Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d
957, 991 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Olson v. Spitzer, 257 N.W.2d 459 (S.D. 1977). See
generally Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 79 CoM. L.J. 75 (1974). Some force majeure clauses have been limited by U.C.C. §
1-102(3), § 1-203, and § 2-302, which prohibit clauses that are manifestly unreasonable,
in bad faith, or unconscionable. See, e.g., Interpetrol Bermuda, 719 F.2d at 1000 n.9;
Eastern Airlines, 532 F.2d at 991 n.96; Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363
F.2d 312, 315 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The courts and one commentator have concluded that any exculpatory provisions
must be specific. Those described in general terms have been held to excuse only unfore-
seen events that make performance impracticable. See Vernon Lumber Corp. v. Harcen
Constr. Co., 60 F. Supp. 555, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd on other grounds, 155 F.2d 348
(2d Cir. 1946); Inter-Coast Steamship Co. v. Seaboard Transp. Co., 291 F. 13 (1st Cir.
1923); 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1342, at 409 (1962).
177. Benson Mineral Group, Inc. v. Northern Natural Gas Co., No. 86-1903, slip op.
at 15 (D. Kan. Apr. 29, 1986) ("When several specific contingencies which will excuse
nonperformance are named in a contract, only the named contingencies will excuse non-
performance."); City of Topeka v. Industrial Gas Co., 135 Kan. 646, 651, 11 P.2d 1034,
1037, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 658 (1932).
178. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 601 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978).
179. Drafters might include language such as:
Under no circumstances shall any changes foreseen or unforeseen in the as-
sumptions underlying the objectives of this Agreement, including but not lim-
ited to the assumptions underlying the pricing or pricing mechanism of this
Agreement including currency fluctuations, delay, or excuse either party's per-
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615 that the parties had not allocated the element of risk in the
transaction.1 80
Finally, the author should, if practically and legally appropriate,
include specific language removing the parties from interpretations
provided by the U.C.C. With skillful drafting, the party at risk can
attempt to create a "seamless" shield against potential intervention. At
the same time, it may limit fruitless and potentially costly litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The doctrines of commercial impracticability, frustration, mistake,
and force majeure have received greater attention for potentially
broader application in recent years because of uncertainty and instabil-
ity in certain segments of the economy."' Courts reluctance to use
these doctrines to a greater extent is a reflection of traditional legal
reasoning. A strict interpretation regarding the implementation of
these doctrines protects the sanctity of contractual relationships while
ensuring economic stability in much of the business community.
Judicial intervention in contractual relationships arose as a means
to protect contracting parties in certain limited "unforeseen" situations
in which one party's loss was much greater than the negotiated risk.
All contractual relationships, however, involve an element of risk, that
the underlying object of the agreement will change in value. Judicially
imposed solutions were never intended to address recognizable changes
in the economy, and courts should not expand the application of these
doctrines to allow contracting parties to escape their contractually
mandated obligations.
When parties enter into an agreement, they allocate risk through
the pricing of the contract, even though such allocation may not be
specifically stated in the agreement.' 8 ' If a party desires to reduce its
exposure, it can do so through a number of economic vehicles. Under
no circumstances, however, should courts alter the element of risk in
long-term agreements when the parties have already allocated the risk
between themselves.
180. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1988).
181. See, e.g., Exxon's Use of Force Majeure to Reduce Deliveries is Debatable,
Experts Say, Wall St. J., Apr. 7, 1989, at A9, col. 1.
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